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Most interpretational problems in law pertain to the meaning of words. 
However, in this paper I address problems caused in Polish courts by grammar 
(namely: syntax and inflexion) of legal provisions. One can distinguish five 
main sources of grammatical issues in judicial interpretation of law: syntax of 
a sentence (i.e. order of words), conjunctive words (i.e. i, lub), punctuation 
marks (i.e. comma, semicolon, dash), nominal grammatical categories (i.e . 
number, gender), verbal grammatical categories (i. e. aspect, tense, mood). 
Traditional Polish canons of interpretation offer no clues on how to deal with  
such issues, stating only that statutes should be construed in accordance with 
the rules of grammar. In fact, cases in which such interpretational issues occur, 
are decided in a highly incoherent manner. The courts tend to feel a tension 
between grammatical form of a provision and its purpose, function, or other 
extra-linguistic values. I think the main reason of such controversy is a very 
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limited vision of grammar shared by the courts, stemmed from primary school 
rather than contemporary linguistic theories. 
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GRAMATYCZNE PROBLEMY INTERPRETA CJI PRAWA – CZY 
PRAKTYKA PRAWNICZA POTRZEBUJE TEORII LINGWISTYCZNEJ? 
ANALIZA ORZECZNICTWA POLSKICH SĄDÓW  
 
Większość problemów w interpretacji prawa tyczy się znaczenia słów 
zawartych w przepisach. W niniejszym tekście chciałbym poruszyć jednak 
problemy, które są powodowane przez gramatykę przepisów. Można wyróżnić 
pięć głównych źródeł tego rodzaju problemów: budowa składniowa zdania 
(np. szyk wyrazów), spójniki (np . i, lub), interpunkcja (np. przecinek, średnik, 
myślnik), deklinacyjne kategorie gramatyczne wyrazów (np. liczba, rodzaj), 
koniugacyjne kategorie gramatyczne wyrazów (np. aspekt, czas, tryb). 
Tradycyjne polskie dyrektywy wykładni nie oferują niemal żadnych 
wskazówek co do radzenia sobie z tego typu problemami. Co najwyżej można 
spotkać się z banalnym zaleceniem, by przepisy prawa interpretować zgodnie 
z regułami gramatyki języka polskiego. W praktyce tego typu sprawy są 
rozstrzygane w sposób wysoce niekonsekwentny. Sądy często dostrzegają 
sprzeczność pomiędzy formą gramatyczną przepisu, a jego celem, funkcją czy  
innymi pozajęzykowymi wartościami. W moim przekonaniu wynika to w 
dużej mierze z faktu, iż wizja gramatyki, jaką dysponują jest bardzo 
ograniczona – wywodzi się raczej z programu szkoły podstawowej niż ze 
współczesnych teorii lingwistycznych. 
 
Słowa klucze: interpretacja prawa, orzecznictwo, gramatyka, składnia, 
wieloznaczność 
Introduction: aim of the study, methodology and 
definitions 
In the act of interpreting statutes, one can encounter various linguistic 
problems. Most of them pertain to the meaning of words. For instance, 
there are ambiguity and vagueness, amongst other phenomena, that 
draw the attention of both legal theory and legal practice (see: Endicott 
2001, Solan 2010: 48, Tobor 2013). As Lawrence Solan puts it: 
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‘Because so many of the interpretive problems in the law are lexical, 
legal scholars have tended to think of meaning, and even language, as 
dealing almost exclusively with the meanings of words’ (Solan 2001: 
245). However, there is also the grammatical aspect of language. And 
accordingly, there are grammatical issues of statutory interpretation. In 
this paper, my aim is to identify these issues, categorize them, show 
how they are dealt with and ask a question about the usefulness of 
linguistic theory for legal practice. 
The following analysis is based on a quasi-empirical research 
of the decisions in which Polish courts deal with grammatical problems 
of interpretation. Let me briefly present employed methodology. First, 
using one of the available legal databases (Lex Omega by Wolters 
Kluwer), I selected judicial decisions featuring keywords related to 
grammar (like grammar, grammatical, syntax, syntactical, case, 
number, gender, aspect, mood, tense, etc.). I restricted my research to 
the decisions of the highest courts in Polish legal system, namely the 
Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) and the Supreme Administrative 
Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny), although it should be noted that 
I made several exceptions for the decisions of lesser courts that I found 
particularly interesting. Then I read all of the selected decisions and I 
eliminated those in which the keywords happened to have nothing to do 
with statutory interpretation. Finally I eliminated those which were 
repeated or otherwise uninteresting. This left me with a sample of over 
two hundreds judicial decisions. Of course said procedure cannot be 
fully considered ‘empirical’ and it does not allow me to make any 
quantitative claims. However I think that it gives a pretty good picture 
of grammatical problems that occur in Polish practice of statutory 
interpretation.   
 To begin my analysis, I need to introduce definitions for two 
pivotal terms that will be extensively used. The first term is ‘grammar’. 
I accept a very traditional sense of grammar, namely that it is a set of 
rules governing creation of words, their modification according to 
different grammatical categories and combining them into compound 
expressions, like clauses, phrases and sentences. In other words I define 
grammar as the rules of word-formation, inflection and syntax. This is 
indeed kind of a school-like approach to grammar. I am aware of more 
modern approaches and they will be briefly discussed in my 
conclusions. However, this traditional sense of grammar is exactly the 
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one shared by Polish courts, or actually Polish judges, and therefore it 
is appropriate for my purposes in this paper. 
 The second pivotal term is ‘statutory interpretation’ (henceforth 
referred to as simply ‘interpretation’). The definition of interpretation 
is a controversial issue in legal theory. There are competing theories for 
both descriptive (what it is), as well as normative (how it should be 
done) nature. The definition that I accept stems from the work of Jerzy 
Wróblewski (see: Wróblewski 1990, Opałek i Wróblewski 1991) and 
was accepted by many influential contemporary scholars (MacCormick 
i Summers 1991: 12). It is particularly suitable for discussing problems 
of legal practice. According to this definition ‘interpretation’ is not just 
any process of ascribing meaning, but a process of ascribing meaning 
to a legal text in which some argumentation is involved in order to 
justify the way it is understood. Such concept of interpretation is 
sometimes referred to as interpretation sensu stricto as opposed to 
interpretation sensu largo, which might correspond  better with 
linguists’ intuitions (Wróblewski 1990: 55–9). 
 Summing up, according to two previously mentioned 
definitions, a grammatical issue of judicial interpretation would be a 
situation in which a grammatical feature of a provision causes 
uncertainty of how it should be understood and it is explicitly discussed 
by court deciding the case. Therefore it is restricted to the cases in which 
the question of grammar becomes a part of the argumentation. 
Classification of grammatical issues 
Having clarified two crucial notions we are now ready to start the 
analysis. My research has shown that from a linguistic point of view 
grammatical issues in judicial interpretation can be divided into two 
main categories. The first category is problems of syntax. It groups 
problems caused by ambiguity of syntactic relations between words in 
sentences. Most of the time, such problems are resolved automatically 
and unreflectively – linguistic or extralinguistic context solves them 
entirely and we do not even notice them (Solan 2010: 31–3). Yet every 
once in a while the context does not suffice and interpretative problems 
emerge. These can be further divided into problems with sentence 
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structure, problems with conjunctive words and problems with 
punctuation marks. The second category is problems of meaning, or 
more specifically, problems of reference. They are caused by 
indeterminacy of relations between grammatical categories of words 
and extralinguistic reality. These can be viewed as a special case of the 
legal acts’ open-texture (Hart 1961: 171-186). They can also be 
subdivided into problems with nominal and verbal grammatical 
categories. Below, I will elaborate on each of these categories and 
provide examples taken from Polish judicial decisions. 
Sentence structure 
Problems with the sentence structure are instances of typical syntactic 
ambiguity, the one that Noam Chomsky made so famous with his 
example: ‘Flying planes can be dangerous’ (Chomsky 1965: 41–2). 
Interestingly, in American literature an analogous case was noted 
(Farell 2008: 37–41). The insurance policy at issue excluded from 
coverage any loss caused directly or indirectly by ‘[f]lood, surface 
water, waves, tides, tidal waves, overflowing of any body of water, or 
their spray, all whether driven by wind or not.’ The interpretative 
problem was whether the word ‘overflowing’ is a gerund or a participle. 
In other words, does the rule excludes only flood, tides etc. that 
overflow or the overflowing itself. 
Polish language is morphologically different and therefore it is 
impossible to find exactly the same kind of problem in Polish case law. 
However, the most common syntactic problems with sentence structure 
also have to do with so called enumerative provisions –provisions 
which include an enumeration of objects, features, conditions etc. Such 
enumerations often include an expression modifying other expressions 
(called a modifier – usually an adjective or a relative clause). 
Sometimes it is not clear whether a modifier refers to all elements of 
the enumeration or only to the element directly next to it.  
In one of the Polish tax statutes, there is a provision providing 
tax relief for ‘expenses incurred for (…) the purchase of individua l 
equipment, devices and technical tools necessary for rehabilitation and 
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facilitating life activities’1. The interpretative problem that was raised 
over and over again upon this provision goes like this: does the 
adjective ‘individual’ refer only to ‘equipment’ or to the whole phrase: 
‘equipment, devices and technical tools’? It is an important practical 
question. Imagine yourself being a disabled person and buying a cell 
phone. Is this purchase tax-free? No doubts that it would facilitate your 
life activities. On the other hand it is no equipment, rather a device (at 
least as long as the semantics of Polish language is concerned). And it 
is surely not individual – it has no individual features. So, must devices 
and technical tools also be individual in order to be tax-free? Not 
surprisingly, administration institutions tend to decide that they must 
(for then they are not tax-free), but administrative courts regularly 
overrule they decisions recognizing that only equipment needs to be 
individual, whereas devices and technical tools do not. What is quite 
confusing is that both institutions and courts argue that their decisions 
are determined purely by the rules of grammar. 
Conjuctions 
Next subcategory of syntactic issues consists of problems caused by 
conjunctive words – words that join other words and phrases. In English 
legal language there are generally two problematic words of this type: 
and and or2. In some states of America their meaning was fixed by the 
legislature itself in an interpretation act (Scott 2010: 360), but generally 
courts (and scholars) are left to deal with them on their own. Their 
analyses are very interesting as they include numerous linguistic and 
extralinguistic factors, like in example: sentence structure, grammatical 
                                                                 
1 „wydatki poniesione na (…) zakup i naprawę indywidualnego sprzętu, urządzeń i 
narzędzi technicznych niezbędnych w rehabilitacji oraz ułatwiających wykonywanie 
czynności życiowych”, art. 26 ust. 7a pkt 3 ustawy z dnia 26 lipca 1991 r. o podatku 
dochodowym od osób fizycznych (Dz.U.2016.2032 j.t.). 
2 There is also the infamous hybrid word and/or that was characterized in a 1935 court 
decision as ‘that befuddling nameless thing, that Janus-faced verbal monstrosity, neither 
word nor phrase, the child of a brain of someone too lazy or too dull to know what he 
did mean’ (Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Tollefson, 263 N.W. 376 at 
377 (1935). 
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number, type of provision, punctuation, articles, sentence context etc. 
(see: Kirk 1970-1971: 242–6, Adams i Kaye 2007: 1167–9). 
Polish language includes more conjunctive words, though most 
of them can be roughly translated as and (i, oraz, a, a także, jak również, 
etc.) or or (lub, albo, bądź). As Polish legal culture is heavily influenced 
by formal logic, courts tend to interpret them with reference to 
logicians’ conventions rather than linguistics. There is an established 
assumption that words i and oraz represent the relation of conjuction, 
while words lub and albo represent the relation of alternative (see: 
Malinowski 2008: 66–7). Still, that leaves a lot of space for 
controversies. Logical relations are obviously very precise and rigid. At 
the same time these words have also ordinary meaning which is similar, 
but less precise, more diversified, subtle and context-dependent. In the 
end courts are often left with the choice between logical and ordinary 
meaning of conjuctions, not to mention that both in formal logic and in 
ordinary language these conjunctive words may also be ambiguous. Let 
us now discuss one of such examples. 
 The provision prohibits ‘storage and carrying of arms and 
ammunition in such a way as to allow unauthorized persons to have 
access to them”3. The defendant was caught carrying two cartridges for 
a hunting rifle and no rifle. Did he commit this crime? The answer 
depends on how we interpret the word ‘and’ (pol. i). If it formulates a 
logical relation of conjunction – the answer would be ‘no’, because he 
met only one of its two necessary conditions. If we interpret it more 
liberally, we can say that the rule is violated regardless of which of its 
two conditions is met. 
In his defense the defendant insisted that word and used in the 
provision represents logical relation of conjuction, and therefore to be 
found guilty of this crime, an offender must carried both a firearm and 
ammunition. As a proof he pointed to other provisions of the statute 
where words ‘arms’ and ‘ammunition’ are joined by the word ‘or’ (pol. 
lub) instead of ‘and’. Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s 
argumentation and ruled that the statute is offended even if the offender 
carried only ammunition (or only a firearm). The court noted that the 
                                                                 
3 „Tej samej karze podlega, kto: (…) przechowuje oraz nosi broń i amunicję w sposób 
umożliwiający dostęp do nich osób nieuprawnionych…”, art. 51 ust. 2 pkt 7 ustawy z 
dnia 21 maja 1999 r. o broni i amunicji (Dz.U.2012.576 j.t.). 
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word and (pol. i) is often used not to introduce conjunction, but simply 
to enumerate things. That is certainly true. However, the court did little 
to prove that this was the case. It mostly relied on a purposive 
argumentation and called the defendant’s interpretation absurd, and yet 
it did not really bothered about the purpose of the statute and failed to 
show what is exactly absurd about not construing an ambiguous 
criminal statute against the defendant. 
 There are many similar examples in which Polish courts 
struggle with conjunctive words. Other than i and oraz (eng. and), the 
most problematic words would be lub and albo (eng. or), usually 
considered to be representing logical relation of alternative. Logicians, 
however, distinguish two kinds of alternative: inclusive and exclusive, 
which is something hard to represent in ordinary language. In the end, 
words like lub are construed in many different ways: sometimes as a 
conjunction, sometimes as an inclusive alternative and sometimes as an 
exclusive alternative. 
Punctuation marks 
The last subcategory of syntactic issues refers to the use of punctuation 
marks in legal provisions. Strictly speaking, punctuation is not a part of 
grammar – it is barely a graphic notation of intonation, accent and other 
prosodic factors (Jodłowski 2002: 22–3). However in many languages, 
including Polish, the function of punctuation is mostly syntactic, and 
that is what justifies its inclusion in my analysis. Apparently, other legal 
scholars also tend to treat punctuation as a part of grammatical aspect 
of language (Scalia i Garner 2012: 160, Jellum 2008: 81). 
In the Anglo-American legal world, punctuation in statutory 
language is generally treated with distrust. There is a historical rationale 
behind it. In England, marginal notes like punctuation were for 
centuries not considered to be part of a statute because they were 
inserted by a clerk only after the statute had been enacted by Parliament. 
Punctuation was something that was not voted on and courts 
acknowledged that. Things changed in the middle of the nineteenth 
century, but the theory of statutory interpretation did not. American 
courts at first followed strictly the English tradition, in spite of different 
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legislative environment. In some States this tradition has even become 
codified in interpretation acts (Scott 2010: 360–1). However, since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, this suspicious attitude towards 
punctuation started to change. Nowadays many influential scholars 
from both intentionalist and textualist camps approve resorting to 
statute’s punctuation as an acceptable indicator of meaning (Marcin 
1977: 245, Jellum 2008: 81, Scalia i Garner 2012: 162). 
 In Polish legal culture this subject has never drawn much 
attention, despite challenging legal practice from time to time. There 
are at least ten punctuation marks used in Polish language, but it seems 
that interpretative problems are caused only by some: semicolon (;), 
hyphen (-), brackets (()) and – most of all – comma (,). Actually comma 
is infamous for being highly problematic in everyday language too. This 
is mostly due to its multifunctional character. It can be used to construct 
enumerations, to substitute different conjunctive words, to divide 
independent phrases in sentences, to separate main and additional 
information, as well as for purely orthographical, or rhythmic, reasons. 
And on top of all that, there is always the risk that a comma was placed 
erroneously due to a scrivener’s error. Let me present one of such 
examples. 
Probably the most famous example of a problematic comma in 
Polish legislation was from the Penal code, enacted in 1997. There was 
an obvious scrivener’s error in one of the provisions. The promulgated 
version stated that ‘whoever causes (…) severe illness that is incurable 
or prolonged illness that is life-threatening (…) shall be punished…’4.  
What it missed was a lone comma after the word ‘prolonged’. In result, 
according to the promulgated version there were two categories of 
illnesses: severe illness that is incurable and prolonged illness that is 
life-threatening, whereas there should be three: severe illness that is 
incurable, severe illness that is prolonged, and: illness that is life-
threatening. That slight change in punctuation had serious 
consequences, because it restricted the scope of the rule. As you may 
imagine it is much harder to cause a prolonged illness that is life-
                                                                 
4 „Kto powoduje ciężki uszczerbek na zdrowiu w postaci (…) ciężkiej choroby 
nieuleczalnej lub długotrwałej choroby realnie zagrażającej życiu”, art. 156 § 1 pkt 2 
ustawy z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny (Dz.U.2016.1137 j.t.). 
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threatening than it is to cause an illness that is life-threatening, but not 
necessarily prolonged. The legislative history was somewhat 
ambiguous on this issue, because the error went unnoticed up until the 
final stages of legislative procedure. However the factual drafters’ 
intention was clear enough. And yet courts – faithful to their expected 
role in a statutory law country such as Poland – refused to amend this 
error on their own. They found the way out, though. Namely they 
started to interpret the word ‘prolonged’ in a very peculiar manner, for 
example stating that a ‘prolonged’ illness does not really need to last 
long. In the end, the lawmaker’s intention was respected, only it was 
the word-meaning, not the punctuation, that suffered. 
Nominal grammatical categories 
Let us now move to the problems of different nature. It is often unclear 
whether a given statutory word – due to its grammatical category – does 
refer to a certain factual situation or not. Such controversy has nothing 
to do with syntax of a provision. It can rather be viewed as a problem 
of ‘classification’ (Tobor 2013: 215) or ‘fact-oriented interpretation’ 
(Guastini 2006: 143). Therefore I label this kind of problems semantic 
or – more precisely – referential. One subcategory of such problems is 
caused by nominal grammatical categories, mostly number5.  
In Polish language – just as in English – there are generally two 
forms of words: singular and plural. A common question is: does a noun 
in singular form refers also to plural objects in extralinguistic reality? 
And vice versa – does a plural noun refers also to a single object? In 
many Common Law systems such issues are regulated by an 
interpretation act (see: Irish Interpretation Act 2005, Canadian 
Interpretation Act 1985, British Interpretation Act 1978, Scott 2010: 
369–71). This problem is not a new one. Jeremy Betham, a famous 
English lawyer and philosopher of the nineteenth century, discussed the 
crime of ‘stealing horses’. He insisted that somebody who stole only 
one horse did not commit this crime, because of the rule of lenity – 
                                                                 
5 Due to inflexional nature of Polish language, other nominal categories like gender or 
case may rather cause a syntactic ambiguity which has been already discussed. 
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stating that ambiguities in criminal law should be resolved in favor of a 
defendant (Scalia i Garner 2012: 131). On the other hand, a 
contemporary French legal scholar claims that the crime of ‘kidnapping 
juveniles’ is commited even if only one juvenile was kidnapped. The 
opposite interpretation he calls absurd (Rabault 1997: 58). 
The same problem occurs also in Polish law. There is an 
illustrative example of a criminal rule: “Whoever breeds or keeps 
greyhounds (…) without permission shall be punished…”6. Note that 
the word ‘greyhounds’ is used in plural form. The defendant had a 
single greyhound without permission and the obvious question was: did 
he commit the crime? On the one hand – there is the literal meaning of 
the statute, coupled with the rule of lenity, or rather its latin equivalents 
known in Poland: Nullum crimen sine lege and In dubio pro reo. On the 
another hand, there is the common sense and the purpose of the statute, 
namely the protection of wild animals. Polish Supreme Court decided 
that a plural form of a noun in a provision does not limit its scope to 
plural objects only. As a proof the court discussed dozen or so examples 
from other criminal statutes in which plural nouns obviously refer to 
single objects and their form is dictated purely by stylistic reasons. It 
also adhered to the statute’s purpose which would undoubtedly be 
breached should the defendant’s interpretation prevailed. The 
argumentation was smart and convincing, nevertheless the decision 
raised a lot of controversy among criminal law scholars. 
Verbal Grammatical categories 
Another subcategory of referential issues groups problems caused by 
verbal grammatical categories, like tense, aspect, mood, voice, etc. In 
American literature verbs are said to be ‘probably the most important 
words in the English language and are most likely to affect the outcome 
of a legal case’; the most common verbal categories to have legal 
consequences being mood and voice (Farell 2008: 2). Polish language 
                                                                 
6 „Kto hoduje lub utrzymuje bez zezwolenia charty rasowe lub ich mieszańce podlega 
karze…”, art. 52 pkt 4 ustawy z dnia 13 października 1995 r. Prawo łowieckie 
(Dz.U.2015.2168 j.t.). 
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differs much from English in the grammar of verbs, and therefore those 
issues are a little difficult to discuss. Mood and voice hardly ever cause 
any interpretative problems and the most problematic are tense (past, 
present, future) and aspect7. The following example includes the 
question of tense. 
The provision stipulates that a prisoner who ‘will not return’ to 
prison on a certain date, shall be punished8. The question was: when 
exactly is this crime committed? On that particular day when he should 
have returned and he did not? Or maybe during the whole period 
between that day and the moment he was finally caught, which would 
make the crime a continued one (a notion well-known in Polish criminal 
law doctrine)? It was a very important question, because there was a 
new statute coming into force on a certain day and the offender had a 
chance of not being punished at all. The answer, however, was not easy. 
The appellate court claimed that ‘will not return’ has a different 
meaning than ‘does not return’ and therefore the crime is committed 
only on a particular day. This decision was overruled by the Supreme 
Court, who stated: ‘will not return’ has a different meaning than ‘did 
not return’ and therefore the crime is committed during a period of time. 
The conclusion of Supreme Court’s opinion sounds somewhat funny, 
because it involved all possible tenses: ‘”Will not return” should be 
understood as “did not return and is still not returning”’. Once again we 
can see that different courts draw different conclusion from the same 
grammatical feature of a provision and claim that their decision is 
dictated purely by the grammar of the statutory language.  
                                                                 
7 There are two aspects in Polish: perfective and imperfective. Yet it should be noted 
that they differ from their English equivalents both in terms of meaning and form (i.e. 
they are usually introduced on a morphological level). 
8 „nie powróci…”, art. 242 § 3 ustawy z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny 
(Dz.U.2016.1137 j.t.). 
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What about linguistic theory? 
Those five cases discussed above are barely a few examples. I 
have chosen them based on their illustrative value and ease of 
translation. They certainly do not cover the whole range of the subject 
matter. The research as a whole, though, allows me to draw some 
conclusions. 
First, I must admit that Polish judges generally make a good use 
of grammatical terminology. In my research I have encountered only a 
few instances of mistakes regarding the use of grammatical terms, two 
of the most common being: confusing the verbal category of tense with 
the category of aspect and mistaking a gerund for a verb. Such mistakes 
rarely affect the power of courts’ argumentation, not to mention the 
outcome of cases. Admittedly, Polish judges know the necessary 
grammatical terminology. 
And yet cases featuring grammatical arguments happen to be 
decided in a highly incoherent manner. It is not uncommon for a lower 
court (or an administration institution) and a higher court to disagree 
upon a given case, while claiming that both their interpretations are 
dictated by the rules of grammar. In fact one may go as far as quote Karl 
Llewelyn that ‘there are two opposing canons on almost every point’ 
(Llewelyn 1950: 401). Below I present a list of opposing directives of 
interpretation used by Polish courts in ‘grammar cases’, inspired by his 
famous ‘thrust-but-parry’ canons of construction list (Llewelyn 1950: 
401–6). 
 
1A. A modifier at the end 
(beginning) of an enumeration 
refers only to the last (first) 
element of such enumeration. 
1B. A modifier at the end 
(beginning) of an enumeration 
refers to all elements of such 
enumeration. 
 
2A. The word and requires that 
all conditions joined by it be 
realized altogether (conjunctive 
meaning). 
 
2B. Word and does not require 
that all conditions joined by it be 
realized altogether (enumerative 
meaning). 
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3A. The word lub (English: or) 
has a different meaning than the 
word albo (English: or). 
 
3B. Words lub (English: or) and 
albo (English: or) have identical 
meaning. 
4A. In absence of a proper 
conjunctive words, a comma 
dividing elements of an 
enumeration has enumerative 
meaning.  
 
4B. In absence of a proper 
conjunctive words, a comma 
dividing elements of an 
enumeration has conjunctive 
meaning. 
5A. Singular and plural noun 
forms have different meanings. 
 
5B. Singular and plural noun 
forms have identical meaning. 
6A. A singular noun form 
indicates a general quantifier (i.e. 
every). 
 
6B. A singular noun form 
indicates a existential quantifier 
(i.e. any). 
7A. An imperfective aspect of a 
verb form means that the denoted 
action has an iterative character. 
 
7B. An imperfective aspect of a 
verb form does not mean that the 
denoted action has an iterative 
character. 
 
8A. A future tense of a verb form 
means that the denoted action 
should occur in the future. 
8B. A future tense of a verb form 
does not mean that the denoted 
action should occur in the future. 
 
How is that possible? My impression is that judges are 
sometimes deceived by the rules of grammar. They resort to them in 
search for precision and certainty, when they are not to be found there. 
Solan is absolutely right claiming that ‘[m]ost battles over legal 
interpretation are battles about the meanings of words. Grammatical 
rules typically remain in the background unnoticed’ (Solan 2001: 244). 
Yet every once in a while, when they are noticed, it is usually because 
of their limitations. First, there is syntactic ambiguity, resulting from 
sentence structure, conjunctive words, or punctuation. In case of 
syntactic ambiguity the rules of grammar offer no solution, because – 
by definition – their allow more than one legitimate interpretation. In 
other words – they say too much. Second, there is referential 
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indeterminacy, resulting from nominal or verbal grammatical 
categories. In case of referential indeterminacy the rules of grammar 
offer no solution, because grammatical categories do not represent 
extralinguistic reality in one-to-one relation. Their relation to reality is 
more or less indirect, even metaphorical (Langacker 2008: 698–702, 
Taylor 2002: 472). It other words – they say too little. 
Judges do not often recognize this aspect of grammar. This is 
probably due to the understanding of grammar they share – this 
traditional, school-like notion that I have defined at the beginning of 
this paper. They tend to think of grammar as a complete set of very 
precise, rigid rules, on pair with the rules of formal logic. That is why 
the feel restricted by them so much and keep arguing that their decisions 
are dictated by the rules of grammar even in the cases of syntactic 
ambiguity or referential indeterminacy. 
In the end it is not grammatical terminology, but rather a 
particular notion of grammar that judges lack. I would advocate for a 
less formal, more functional approach to grammar that would extend 
the scope of interpretative possibilities rather than narrowing it, and that 
would embrace the role of other meaningful factors, like word-meaning, 
linguistic and extralinguistic context, purpose of the statute, etc. 
Traditional approach, instead, tends to conflict with them and creates 
an unhealthy tension between ‘form’ and ‘spirit’ of statutory language. 
It is this tension that is responsible for the incoherence of decisions in 
‘grammar cases’. 
The approach I am advocating for can be found, amongst others 
theories, in the field of cognitive linguistics. Cognitive linguistics is 
currently regarded the dominant linguistic theory in the academic 
world. Actually, it is not a single theory, but rather a group o theories, 
including cognitive grammar (Ronald Langacker), conceptual 
metaphor (George Lakoff, Mark Johnson), prototype semantics 
(Eleanor Rosch, John Taylor), mental spaces and conceptual blending 
(Gilles Fauconnier, Mark Turner) and many others. Their common 
denominator is the idea that language is not an abstract phenomena of 
social nature (Saussure’s claim), nor an autonomous faculty of human 
mind (Chomsky’s claim), but a part of human cognitive system, and 
thus based on more rudimentary capacities of human brain such as 
perception, categorization and memory. Meaning is therefore grounded 
in our sensual experience. And it is this embodied meaning, not form, 
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that is primary in language and that motivates various linguistic 
phenomena, including grammar. 
It is quite unfortunate that legal scholars, so obsessed with 
language and twentieth century’s philosophy of language, have been 
almost completely ignoring the development of modern linguistics . 
While the ground-breaking works of Ferdinand de Saussure or Noam 
Chomsky arguably did not offer much in terms of legal theory, the work 
of Langacker, Lakoff and others, obviously do. Some of them in fact 
have addressed this issue directly (see: Lakoff 1989, Johnson 2002, 
2007, Turner 2013). They also inspired several legal scholars, who 
successfully applied concepts like conceptual metaphor, prototype 
semantics or radial categories to the problems of legal theory and even 
legal dogmatics (see: Winter 2001, Solan 2001 (red.), Berger 2004, 
Schane 2006, Dyer 2007, Osenga 2011, Manzanares 2014). Still, I 
believe cognitive linguistics have much more to offer to legal theory 
and the theory of statutory interpretation in particular. A fresh, more 
functional and flexible approach to the grammar of legal texts is just 
one example. 
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